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1   IntroductionAbstract 
 
 
We examine the implications of monetary union for macroeconomic stabilisation in catching up 
participating countries. We allow member states’supply conditions to differ inside the union, 
especially with regard to sectoral characteristics. Sectoral productivity shocks on balance hamper 
the stabilisation properties of a currency union. In the face of aggregate supply disturbances, the 
stabilisation costs of renouncing monetary autonomy diminish with a flatter output-inflation 
tradeoff and - barring idiosyncratic shocks - with a larger reference country size, more 
homogeneous supply slopes and a higher preference for price stability. 
 
 
JEL classification: E52; E58; F33; F40 
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May 2006Non-technical summary
The experience and prospects of monetary integration around the world
have attracted a wide-ranging literature over the last ￿fty years. The aim
of this paper is to contribute to the theory of currency unions by examining
the implications of the latter￿ s monetary stabilisation policy for catching-up
member states. Catching up economies tend to exhibit productivity-driven
real appreciation processes of the type known as the Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect.
In order to account for this, we allow sectoral productivity shocks to in￿ u-
ence real exchange rate movements. Moreover, currency unions comprising
economies that are at di⁄erent stages of the development process face chal-
lenges arising from structural di⁄erences among member states. With this in
mind, we analyse scenarios that re￿ ect plausible cross-country con￿gurations
concerning structural parameters and disturbances.
In order to compare a member state￿ s welfare in a currency union to that
under autonomous monetary policy, we set relative welfare at the value im-
plied by benchmark structural parameter values. We then carry out sensi-
tivity analysis with respect to parameter values with the aim of uncovering
what determines stabilisation costs of renouncing monetary autonomy. Key
parameters of our model include the slopes of the aggregate supply schedule
and cross-country di⁄erences between them, countries￿sizes, and the relative
weights placed on price stability versus output stability in the monetary au-
thority￿ s objective function. Our approach is motivated by the notion that it is
important to better understand the determinants of stabilisation costs, while
at the same time recognising that a number of other factors play a key role
in shaping a country￿ s decision to enter a currency union. The latter factors
prominently include the trade-enhancing e⁄ects of monetary union of the type
found by Rose (2000) and other studies.
Our study of monetary policy in a currency union produces a number of
di⁄erent results. Sectoral productivity shocks are on balance found to ham-
5
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May 2006per the stabilisation performance of member states joining a currency union.
We also assess the determinants of stabilisation costs in the face of aggregate
supply disturbances. Our analysis shows that the output-in￿ ation tradeo⁄
and country size have welfare implications for a reference country. A ￿ atter
tradeo⁄ between output and in￿ ation is found to unambiguously contribute
to an improvement of the currency union￿ s stabilisation properties from the
member state￿ s point of view. In turn, a larger size also appears to have a
rather favourable impact on the reference country￿ s welfare under the currency
union case, possibly excepting the case of a reference country mostly facing
idiosyncratic disturbances while exhibiting a steep output-in￿ ation tradeo⁄.
Moreover, a higher cross-country spread in the slopes of the aggregate sup-
ply curve tends to favour currency union￿ s member states with relatively ￿ at
tradeo⁄s between output and in￿ ation. Finally, monetary unions that display
a higher preference for price stability are found to also improve the stabil-
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EU new member states from Central and Eastern Europe have in recent years
gone through a rapid adjustment process as they approached entry into the
EU. The pre-accession phase has been characterised by structural transfor-
mations of their economies, real exchange rate appreciation and rapid capital
in￿ ows. While these features are present in many emerging market economies
(EMEs) as they catch up with industrial countries, new member states di⁄er
from those experiences in that they are expected to face special circumstances
constraining domestic macroeconomic policies in their post-accession phase. In
particular, ￿scal instruments will have to comply with certain criteria, while
prospects of participation in the euro zone may limit exchange rate ￿ uctua-
tions, especially in case they are or will become members of ERM II.
For this reason, it is understandable that some studies have analysed the
policy options facing individual new member states in areas such as mone-
tary and exchange rate policy (see, e.g., Devereux, 2003, and Natalucci and
Ravenna, 2002). The present paper studies a di⁄erent issue raised by the EU
accession process, namely, the implications of a currency union￿ s monetary
stabilisation policy for catching-up member states. To do so, we distinguish
between aggregate and sectoral productivity shocks. Sectoral productivity dis-
turbances are allowed to account for real exchange rate movements, including
the type of real appreciation processes known as the Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect.1
Our model is similar to the one used by Ca￿Zorzi et al. (2005) to investigate
the decision of a country to enter a currency union, for which they derive ana-
lytical results.2 In addition, we derive results for scenarios that are reasonable
for monetary unions comprising economies that are at di⁄erent stages of the
development process. In particular, we assess challenges posed to common
1This e⁄ect consists of the necessity of real exchange rate appreciation as a reaction to
high productivity growth in the tradable sector relative to the non-tradable sector.
2Other contributions to the literature that are relevant for the present paper are Alesina
and Barro (2002), and Benigno (2004).
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country-speci￿cities concerning structural parameters and disturbances. By
bringing the dimensions of aggregate and sectoral productivity into the analy-
sis, we aim at reaching a deeper understanding of the bene￿ts and costs from
monetary unions relative to autonomous monetary policy.
Given that issues raised by processes of structural change - including
productivity-driven exchange rate developments - are important in many catch-
ing up countries, the insights provided by our analysis are not meant to be
valid only for EU new member states, but among many EMEs more broadly.3
This includes countries for which monetary union is a real possibility in the
near future (such as other countries in Central and Eastern Europe holding EU
candidacy), as well as cases where currency unions remain a more prospective
policy option discussed by analysts on a regular basis (such as EMEs in East
Asia and Latin America).4 In connection with this, it is worth mentioning that
the relevance of currency unions as a policy option has not been called into
question by the recent debate about the optimality of exchange rate regimes.
One strand of this literature has interpreted the instability of ￿xed exchange
rate systems to imply that the only viable long-term options for a country
are a ￿ oating exchange rate or participation in a currency union. This view,
commonly known as the "hollowing-out hypothesis" was originally proposed
by Fischer (2001). Alternatively, some authors have stressed that many o¢ -
cially pure ￿ oating regimes are in practice managed ￿ oats, thereby defying the
3Moreover, cross-country di⁄erences in structural parameters and the distribution of
shocks are not restricted to the case of the catching up process. For instance, Romer (1993)
argues and shows evidence that openness to international trade reduces equilibrium in￿ ation
by a⁄ecting two structural parameters, namely, the trade-o⁄ between output and in￿ ation,
and monetary authorities￿relative weight on price stability.
4There is a considerable ongoing debate concerning the role of the Balassa-Samuelson
e⁄ect in explaining real appreciation processes in fast-growing small open economies. See,
e.g., Egert et. al. (2003), MacDonald and Wojcik (2004), Mihaljek and Klau (2004), De
Broeck and Slok (2001) and Halpern and Wyplosz (2001) for Central and Eastern European
countries, Sinn and Reutter (2001) for the euro area, and Devereux (1999) and Ito et. al.
(1999) for the Asia region.
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desire for relative exchange rate stability may be driven by regional compe-
tition considerations, this raises the question whether such stability could be
best achieved by regional monetary cooperation and in particular a currency
union. The latter arrangement could, if economically justi￿ed and properly
designed, help maintain exchange rate stability while mitigating credibility
problems sometimes arising in intermediate regimes.6
Other features of our approach are the following. First, we permit distur-
bances to adopt three di⁄erent features, namely, to be common, idiosyncratic
or asymmetric. This distinction is useful in drawing welfare implications from
comparing monetary stabilisation properties of a currency union vis-￿-vis a
￿ oating exchange rate arrangement. Second, we complement our analytical
results with quantitative comparisons of stabilisation performance. We mea-
sure the latter by the loss function of the currency union￿ s monetary authority
relative to the alternative of autonomous monetary policy. Finally, we do
sensitivity analysis with respect to key structural parameters, including the
slopes of the aggregate supply schedule, countries￿sizes, and the weight placed
on price stability versus output stability in the monetary authority￿ s objec-
tive function.7 In doing so, we permit in our simulations a key structural
parameter (the supply slope parameter) to di⁄er across countries.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, the
model is laid out. As a prelude to the analysis of a currency union, we analyse
optimal monetary policy under the alternative of autonomous monetary policy
5Some of the skeptics have pointed to a ￿fear of ￿ oating￿whereby countries that declare
themselves ￿ oaters nevertheless intervene regularly to prevent full ￿ exibility of the exchange
rate. The key paper in this area is Calvo and Reinhart (2002). In parallel, a related literature
has recently proposed de facto exchange regime classi￿cations as opposed to IMF-type de
jure ones (see, e.g., Reinhart and Rogo⁄, 2004).
6The idea of joining a currency union as a commitment strategy has been developed in
Alesina and Barro (2002).
7Lane (2000) performs sensitivity analysis with respect to key parameter values in a two-
country model. Our approach di⁄ers from his in that the focus here is on the implications
of monetary integration for member countries, rather than of the stabilisation performance
of the currency union itself. For related work, see SÆnchez (2005a and 2005b).
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a currency union. Section 5 develops the quantitative comparative results on
stabilisation performance and sensitivity analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 A simple model
In order to investigate monetary stabilisation properties of a currency union,
we set up a simple model that distinguishes between aggregate and sectoral
productivity shocks. In the present setting, such sectoral shocks contribute
to determine the behaviour of real exchange rates. Moreover, monetary non-
neutrality, introduced by having the nominal wage set prior to the realisation
of shocks, is used to derive the aggregate supply schedule.
2.1 Sectors and aggregation
Let us de￿ne a fast growing small open economy as country h and its larger
partner f. Both economies produce traded (T) and non-traded (N) goods.
We use the following indices for countries and sectors, respectively: i = h;f
and k = T;N. The model is in logs and all variables are interpreted as
growth rates unless stated otherwise. All variables are expressed in logarithms.
All parameters are assumed to be positive. All shocks are of the zero-mean,
constant variance type. They are also assumed to be uncorrelated with each
other for each economy i, but allowed to be correlated across countries, as is
made clear below.
Output can be aggregated over traded and non-traded sectors as follows:
yi = ￿iyT
i + (1 ￿ ￿i)yN
i (1)
where ￿i denotes the share of the traded goods in real output. Consistently
with this speci￿cation, the price level is given by a weighed average of the
10
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i , and the price of non-traded goods, pN
i :
pi = ￿ipT
i + (1 ￿ ￿i)pN
i (2)
while demand for sectoral output is assumed to depend only on relative prices:
yk
i ￿ yi = ￿(pk
i ￿ pi) (3)
2.2 Relative prices







i is sector-k total factor productivity and lk
i is sector-k employment
while ￿k
i 2 (0;1). Aggregating over sectors gives:
yi = ai + ￿i￿T
i lT
i + (1 ￿ ￿i) ￿N
i lN
i (5)
where ai ￿ ￿iaT
i + (1 ￿ ￿i)aN
i measures aggregate total factor productivity
in country i. The sectoral demands for labour are derived by equating the




i ￿ wi (6)
where wi is the nominal wage rate, which is equalised across sectors. The
latter expression can be re-arranged as follows:
pN
i ￿ pT
i = ( yT
i ￿ lT
i ) + ( yN
i ￿ lN
i ) (7)
If productivity growth in the traded sector is greater than in the non-traded
sector, the relative price for non-traded goods increases. This is the way the
11
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the economy.8 In the next subsection we discuss Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect in
the context of real exchange rate determination.
One corollary from (3) and (7) is that employment is uniform across sectors,
that is, lT
i = lN





i ) + ( ￿T
i ￿ ￿N
i )li (8)
2.3 Real exchange rate and sectoral productivity shocks
Let us de￿ne qT
i to be the relative tradable price between countries i and f
in country i￿ s currency. If s is the nominal exchange rate (the amount of




f + s ￿ pT
h, which can be interpreted as a deviation from the law
of one price between our two countries.9 Moreover, by construction qT
f = 0:
Using these expressions, together with (2) and (8), we obtain
ph = pT
f + s + ￿h (9)
pf = pT
f + ￿f (10)









h: Furthermore, the real
exchange rate can be de￿ned as e = pf +s￿ph: Note that a fall in e represents
a real appreciation for country h. Using the latter two de￿nitions, together
with (9) and (10), we can express the real exchange rate as e = ￿(￿h ￿ ￿f):
8It is worth saying that perfect labour mobility across sectors may fail to hold in the
short-run. Compared with the analysis pursued here, that would weaken the power of the
Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect at the cyclical frequency that is relevant for analysis of monetary
policy.
9Failure of the law of one price to hold, even if we assume a single traded good inter-
nationally, can be rationalised in terms of cross-border frictions. The literature has given
several explanations for this, including transaction costs and imperfect information. Some
papers have stressed that, even if the law of one price were to hold at the docks, the observed
retail price would deviate from the world price because of (non-traded) domestic inputs in
the chain of distribution of tradable goods (Burstein et al., 2003), or failure of the CPI
measure to capture quality adjustments of tradable goods (Burstein et al., 2005).
12
ECB
Working Paper Series No 630




















From (11), one observes that there are four forces contributing to determine
the real exchange rate. Let us analyse these four forces in turn for the case of
a decrease in e. First, a real appreciation would, ceteris paribus, result from a
higher di⁄erential between h and f in total factor productivity in the tradable
relative to the non-tradable sector. That is, if (aT
h ￿ aN
h ) > (aT
f ￿ aN
f ): This
is the form that the Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect takes in our model. This e⁄ect
depends on assumptions regarding the other three forces driving real exchange
rates.10 Second, a real appreciation would obtain if one of the two countries
exhibits positive di⁄erentials with respect to the other in the product of the
two following factors: a) deviations in employment from steady state (li), and
b) the gap between the elasticities of sectoral output with respect to labour in
the tradable sector and that in the non-tradable sector (￿T
i ￿￿N












lf: Third, the former two forces would be ampli￿ed
by a di⁄erential degree of openness in country f￿ s favour, that is, if ￿h < ￿f:
Fourth, a real appreciation would result from a deviation from the law of one
price between our two countries, that is, if qT
h > 0.
We shall below relate ￿ uctuations in e to sectoral productivity shocks. For
this purpose, it is useful to group the latter shocks hitting country i in the
disturbance ￿i; which we de￿ne as a shock to variable ￿i; that is, ￿i ￿ ￿i￿E(￿i);
where E(￿i) denotes the unconditional expectation of ￿i.11 Finally, unexpected
developments in exchange rates are described by ￿e ￿ ￿(￿h ￿ ￿f): In what
follows, we shall interpret changes to ￿e as driven by sectoral productivity
10In particular, the Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect obtains under the following "neutral" (suf-








f ; and iii) q
T
h = 0.
11In what follows, E(x) denotes the unconditional expectation of any variable x.
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2.4 Nominal rigidity and aggregate supply
We introduce nominal wage rigidity by assuming that in each country the
economy-wide nominal wage is set so as to minimise the expected deviation
of aggregate employment li from its long run ￿ exible-wage level
_
li: Moreover,
labour supply is assumed to be perfectly inelastic in the long run, more con-
cretely at
_
li = 0: In this context, when setting the nominal wage wi prior to
the realisation of shocks, the trade union expects E(
_
li) = 0; which implies
E(yi) = E(ai) from aggregating over (3). Furthermore, aggregating over (6),
the optimal wage rate satis￿es wi = E(pi)+E(yi): We implicitly assume that
workers are prepared to meet any demand for labour required by ￿rms af-
ter the realisation of shocks. Given (3), (6) and the expression for wi just
obtained, the aggregate supply schedule obtains:
yi =
_
yi + ￿i [pi ￿ E(pi)] + "i (12)
where
_
yi = E(yi) = E(ai) is the natural output level of the economy, ￿i ￿
￿i=(1 ￿ ￿i) is the slope of the supply curve, "i ￿ [ai ￿ E(ai)]=(1 ￿ ￿i) is the
aggregate supply shock, and ￿i ￿ ￿T
i + ￿i(￿T
i ￿ ￿N
i ): Parameter ￿i is likely
to re￿ ect cross-country di⁄erences in economic structure among countries. In
particular, it has been argued that trade openness, by raising the exchange-
rate pass-through e⁄ect on prices of a given economic expansion, makes the
tradeo⁄ between output and in￿ ation ￿ atter (Romer, 1993; Lane, 1997).13
Taken literally, this would imply a negative link between coe¢ cients ￿i and ￿i
in our model. For this to happen, taking into account both the positive link
12It is worth mentioning, however, that another factor determining ￿e are violations in
the law of one price, as captured by q
T
h .
13This relationship between openness and the aggregate supply slope has recently been
challenged by Temple (2002). Barry (2001) shows that the relationship still holds under
monopolistic competition in the non-tradable sector.
14
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shocks in country h relative to f; that is, as a stochastic Balassa-Samuelsonbetween ￿i and ￿i and the latter￿ s de￿nition, we need that ￿N
i > ￿T
i . This
result is not surprising, in light of our discussion surrounding expression (11).
Indeed, the inequality ￿N
i > ￿T
i means that, other things equal, the country￿ s
tradable sector￿ s productivity is not as high as in the non-tradable sector. This
contributes to an exchange rate depreciation and thus - in a context of larger
trade openness - to a ￿ atter output-in￿ ation tradeo⁄.
It is worth mentioning that trade openness is also sometimes seen as be-
ing inversely related to country size. Many studies have found that smaller
economies tend to be more open to international trade, while the world￿ s
largest countries (topped by the US and Japan) are rather closed in terms of
trade to GDP ratios. Alesina et al. (2005) summarise the arguments and the
evidence about the link in question. They ￿nd that trade openness, by enhanc-
ing the magnitude of the market facing a given country, increases the bene￿ts
of small size. Conversely, small countries have a strong interest in maintain-
ing access to international markets (including via multilateral and regional
means). We shall later assess our results having the relationship between size
and openness in mind. Lacking a precise estimate of the correlation between
these two variables, though, constrains us to a purely qualitative evaluation
in this area.
3 Autonomous monetary policy
Under this regime, the monetary authority chooses its policy independently at













14Modern research in macroeconomics shows that quadratic loss functions such as (13)
here can be, under certain conditions, interpreted as a second order approximation to the
welfare of the representative agent (see, e.g., Woodford, 2003),. The present paper makes the
standard simplifying assumption that the marginal rate of substitution between the target
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pi; respectively. For simplicity, we assume
that
~
pi adopts a ￿xed and credible value. In the present context, the central
bank has no incentive to surprise the private sector with in￿ ation. In con-
sequence, there is no in￿ ation bias. Parameter ￿i denotes the central bank￿ s
relative weight of price stability versus output stability.
We assume that country i￿ s public knows ￿i, ￿i;
~
pi; as well as the dis-
tribution of the aggregate and sectoral productivity disturbances underlying
"i and ￿i for all i. We also assume that the central bank and ￿rms observe
current output, prices and nominal exchange rates. With this information,
and knowledge of the structure of the model, they are in a position to deduce
the sources of the shocks that hit the economy.
To solve the model, it is convenient to think of the central bank as choosing
pi to minimise its loss function. Optimisation, after imposing rational expec-
tations and using our simplifying assumption that
~
pi is ￿xed and credible,
implies that E(pi) =
~
pi: This result can be used to express optimal output















where deviations of output and prices from target are shown to respond only
to aggregate supply shocks.
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In the case where countries h and f form a monetary union, we assume that












where u denotes the monetary union regime.15 In (17), the objective function
of the central bank penalises departures of union-wide output and prices from




pu, respectively. In resemblance to the country-
level analysis of the previous section, we assume that the union￿ s public knows
￿i;￿;
~
pi; as well as the distribution of the aggregate and sectoral productiv-
ity disturbances underlying "i and ￿i for all i. The remaining informational
assumptions are also analogous to those used in the last section.
Before we turn to the solution of the model, let us de￿ne di⁄erent types of
shocks according to their distribution across the union. This will be needed
when interpreting the results and doing welfare analysis. In the case of ag-
gregate supply shocks, we examine the three types of shocks, namely: (i)
asymmetric; (ii) idiosyncratic; and (iii) common. Shocks are normalised to be
of unit magnitude for country h; which is - without loss of generality - the
focus of our comparisons across regimes. Asymmetric shocks are de￿ned to be
shocks such that they add up to zero at the currency union level; in particular,
country h of size ’ is assumed to face a shock equal to 1, while country f faces
a shock equal to ￿’=(1￿’): Idiosyncratic shocks are those in which shocks to
country h equal 1, and shocks to country f equal 0. Finally, common shocks
are de￿ned to be shocks such that both countries face a shock equal to 1:
In the case of sectoral productivity disturbances a⁄ecting ￿i and contribut-
ing to impact the exchange rate between h and f, we take into account that
the variable ￿e has a relative connotation that is absent in "i. The common
15Union-wide variables are weighted averages using weights ’ 2 (0;1) for country h and
1 ￿ ’ for country f.
17
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is achieved by assuming that both countries h and f face a shock equal to
1. As with aggregate shocks, the idiosyncratic disturbance takes place when
only country h is hit (by a disturbance ￿h equal to 1). Finally, in the case of
a asymmetric sectoral productivity shock, country h faces a shock ￿h equal to
1, while country f faces a shock ￿f equal to ￿1:16
4.1 Determination of union-wide output and prices
To solve the model, let us start by taking averages over (12), which yields
yu = ￿u [pu ￿ E(pu)] + "u + ￿ (18)
where ￿ ￿ ’(￿h ￿ ￿u)[ph ￿ E(ph)] + (1 ￿ ’)(￿f ￿ ￿u)[pf ￿ E(pf)]. We
next replace (18) into (17), di⁄erentiate with respect to pu to get the ￿rst-
order condition and impose rational expectations. As a result, we derive an







("u + ￿) (19)
where we have also used the result that E(pu) =
~
pu.
Using (18) and (19), alongside (9), (10) and the de￿nition of ￿e at the end














["u ￿ ’(1 ￿ ’)(￿h ￿ ￿f)￿e] (21)
Equations (20) and (21) indicate that union-wide output and prices hover
around their targeted values. Unexpected developments in each of the two
16In consequence, ￿e equals 0 under a common shock, -1 under an idiosyncratic shock,
and -2 under an asymmetric shock.
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aggregate supply shocks in "u, the second terms in (20) and (21) re￿ ect the
following mechanism: if country i is subjected to such disturbances the reac-
tion of union-wide output and in￿ ation will be increasing in the size of that
country (’ in the case of country h and 1 ￿ ’ in the case of f).
4.2 Currency union￿ s welfare
Use of (20) and (21) leads to a new expression for the realised loss function




["u ￿ ’(1 ￿ ’)(￿h ￿ ￿f)￿e]
2 (22)





: When shocking the currency union￿ s economies, we
do so in ways that aggregate disturbances "u and sectoral shocks ￿e are uncor-
related with each other. In this way, we can isolate the individual impact of
each shock. Moreover, it is worth saying that aggregate and sectoral produc-
tivity disturbances have the following properties in terms of the cross-country
covariances. An asymmetric shock implies a negative such covariance between
countries h and f, an idiosyncratic shock amounts to a zero covariance between
the two countries, and a common shock means that the covariance between
countries h and f is 1.
The single monetary authority￿ s welfare loss function Lu is not the fo-
cus of our analysis, which instead lies with the reference country h￿ s welfare.
However, the analysis of Lu indirectly sheds light on the latter in light of
the relevant impact of monetary policy actions on country h0s economy under
the currency union. In (22), the cross-country distribution of aggregate and
sectoral supply disturbances a⁄ects the union￿ s realised welfare loss in Lu in
a way that depends on speci￿c parameter values. Under idiosyncratic aggre-
gate productivity shocks a small catching up economy would have a limited
19
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large. Taking as a benchmark the case when the supply slope parameter is
uniform across the union, sectoral productivity disturbances fail to have an
impact on welfare. Supply slope parameters are likely to exhibit cross-country
variation if member states are at di⁄erent stages in the development process.
In this case, idiosyncratic and asymmetric sectoral supply disturbances are
found to hamper a currency union￿ s stabilisation performance, while common
shocks instead exhibit a built-in dampening factor, thereby enhancing the case
for monetary stabilisation in a common currency area. Both country-speci￿c
output-in￿ ation tradeo⁄s and the occurrence of idiosyncratic or asymmetric
shocks are arguably more likely in the presence of catching up member states.
4.3 Reference member state￿ s welfare
The focus of our analysis is the comparison between country h￿ s welfare under
autonomous monetary policy (Lh in (16)) and its welfare as a member state.

















h are the values adopted by h￿ s output and prices under cur-
rency union participation. The values of yu
h and pu
h can be determined as
follows. In case supply slope parameter ￿i displays cross-country variation,
those values can be found - alongside the corresponding values for country f,
yu
f and pu
f; for a total of four unknowns - by solving the following four equa-
tions: two national supply curves (12) for i = h;f; and the pair of expressions
(20) and (21).17 Given that we focus on the perspective of a catching up
country, a scenario of common supply slopes ￿i appears to be relatively less
likely. Moreover, it is worth admitting that this case also proves somewhat
more di¢ cult to formalise, as we discuss in the Appendix. In what follows, we
17The Appendix presents these equations in more detail.
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concentrate on the case of country-speci￿c output-in￿ ation tradeo⁄s.5 Relative performance and sensitivity analysis
Following the qualitative results found in the previous section, we now turn
to the quantitative analysis of a member state￿ s welfare in a currency union
relative to that in the autonomous monetary policy case. In doing so, we aim
at gauging how sensitive are the performance di⁄erences between regimes to
variations in key parameter values.
The ￿rst distinction to be drawn is that between aggregate and sectoral
productivity shocks.18 The latter do not enter the reference country h￿ s welfare
function (16) under monetary autonomy. Neither do sectoral shocks a⁄ect the
reference country￿ s welfare under the currency union when they are common,
given that in this case the single monetary authority does not react. However,
disturbances in ￿e have an adverse e⁄ect on h￿ s welfare (23) when they are
asymmetric or idiosyncratic. The reason is that such types of shocks elicit
reactions from the monetary union￿ s central bank that would (optimally) be
absent under monetary autonomy. The latter scenarios of asymmetric and
idiosyncratic disturbances make the di⁄erence, with autonomous monetary
policy thus outperforming its alternative under sectoral shocks. Unlike the
latter, aggregate supply shocks enter countries￿welfare loss function both un-
der monetary autonomy and the currency union. This also makes the com-
parative assessment of the performance of each regime particularly involved,
with neither autonomous monetary policy nor the currency union clearly out-
performing its alternative. We turn to this analysis in subsection 5.2, after
setting up baseline parameter values in subsection 5.1.
18The relationship between aggregate and sectoral productivity shocks is little understood.
JimØnez-Rodr￿guez and SÆnchez (2005) show empirically that an adverse supply disturbance
(an oil price shock to advanced net oil importing economies) induces di⁄erent reactions in
real exchange rates. In particular, the real exchange rate appreciates in some countries (such
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In making relative welfare comparisons, we consider the three types of shocks
de￿ned in the previous subsection, namely: (i) asymmetric; (ii) idiosyncratic;
and (iii) common. In order to illustrate the workings of the model by means
of simulations, we initially report results for a benchmark set of parameters.
The parameter values used here follow previous work on calibrated models.
While this means that our choice is constrained by available studies, the next
subsection will more generally examine the sensitivity of relative stabilisation
performance to changes in key parameters of the model. As discussed in the
previous section, we assume that the supply schedule parameter ￿i displays
cross-country variation. Let ￿0
i ￿ 1=￿i be its inverse, which represents the
reaction of in￿ ation to the output gap. Country-speci￿c values of ￿0
i hover
around a central value which is chosen to be ￿0 = 0:4, as in Ball (1999).
More concretely, we allow for two values for ￿0




= 0:45 and a
low value ￿
￿
0 = 0:35: Our benchmark value for ’ is 0.1. Finally, we assume a
common value for ￿i and ￿: For this parameter, we use Broadbent and Barro￿ s
(1997) estimate of 2:58, obtained using US data.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis is relevant for welfare analysis in the present paper. We
have seen that, when the reference country is hit by aggregate supply shocks,
neither the currency union nor autonomous monetary policy dominates its
alternative. The present subsection assesses how sensitive is the relative per-
formance between the two regimes to changes in key parameter values. In
doing so, we ￿rst construct the ratio Cuh = Lu
h=Lh. This ratio expresses the
value of reference country h￿ s loss function under a currency union in propor-
tion to that obtained under autonomous monetary policy. In both cases, we
set this ratio to one at benchmark parameter values; that is, all values of the
ratio are to be interpreted in relation to the benchmark case.
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i, whose cross-country
variation plays a major role in the present model. In this regard, we carry out
sensitivity analysis with respect to the central value for this parameter, ￿0; and
the di⁄erence between high and low alternative values for the latter, which we






0: In addition, we examine the e⁄ects of varying
two other parameters, namely, the size of the reference country, ’; and the
relative weight placed by the monetary authority on price stability in its loss
function, ￿: We consider the three scenarios of common, idiosyncratic and
asymmetric aggregate disturbances. As in Lane (2000), the analysis of the
impact of changing these parameters is made conditional on the occurrence of
these various types of shocks. In other words, we treat the size and asymmetry
of shocks as exogenous, disregarding for tractability the possibility - discussed
by Frankel and Rose (1998) - that the distribution of shocks and parameter
values might both depend on the intensity of regional integration (which is
di⁄erent across monetary policy regimes).
Figures 1 through 4 show the relative welfare loss under aggregate supply
shocks as measured by the ratio Cuh for di⁄erent types of reference countries,
cross-country distribution of shocks and parameter values. In Figure 1, we
consider the e⁄ects on relative stabilisation performance of varying ￿0 over
the range [0.2-0.6]. An increase in ￿0 indicates a higher responsiveness of in-
￿ ation to the output gap. In all cases considered, that is, for all combinations
of reference countries, types of aggregate shocks and parameter values, we see
that a higher ￿0 induces an increasingly better relative performance of country
h￿ s welfare under the currency union case. In the scenario of common shocks,
both types of reference countries bene￿t from the homogenising e⁄ect of a rise
in ￿0 - the central value of ￿0
i - for a given value of spread. Under asymmetric
shocks, the single monetary authority does not react, and thus member states￿
welfare is not a⁄ected by changes in ￿0. What in this case drives the improve-
ment in h￿ s welfare under the currency union relative to monetary autonomy
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tradeo⁄ between output and in￿ ation becomes ￿ atter.19 In light of the refer-
ence country￿ s small size, this e⁄ect in place under asymmetric disturbances
also plays a role in improving the relative performance of monetary union in
the face of idiosyncratic shocks.
Figure 2 reports sensitivity analysis for spread over [0.05-0.35]. Under
common aggregate productivity shocks, the di⁄erences between countries h
and f are constrained to their sizes and the values of ￿0
i. The latter di⁄er-
ence drives the contrasting results between Cases H and L in panel (a). The
value of h￿ s loss function (16) increases as ￿0
h rises (as in Case H for increas-
ing spread) and thus the tradeo⁄ between output and in￿ ation turns ￿ atter;
this contributes to lowering relative loss Cuh in Case H. Following mutatis
mutandis the same logic, reference country h￿ s loss function under monetary
autonomy drops with lower values of ￿0
h (as in Case L for rising spread), there-
fore hampering the relative performance of currency union. The same factor
drives the broadly similar results found for asymmetric shocks (once more, in
the absence of changes in the loss function (23) under the currency union),
while relative welfare is little sensitive to spread in the face of idiosyncratic
disturbances.
In Figure 3, we vary ’ over the range [0.05-0.5]. An increase in ’ a⁄ects
welfare only in the currency union. Under common shocks, as ’ rises the
reference country bene￿ts, relative to monetary autonomy, from increasing
cross-country uniformity within the currency union. In panel (b), we see that
under idiosyncratic shocks the improvements in the stabilisation properties of
monetary union are steady only in Case H. We ￿nd that one factor behind
this discrepancy is that, in the absence of shocks to country f, the magnitude
of deviations in prices from target (which happens to have a large in￿ uence on
country h￿ s loss function) depends on the union-wide tradeo⁄ between output
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place for higher values of ’ under Case H) the smaller is country h￿ s price
level gap (in deviation from target) under the currency union, and thus the
higher the relative welfare derived from the latter regime. Under asymmetric
shocks, the monetary union is unresponsive to changes in country sizes, which
is also the case for the monetary autonomy case regardless of the cross-country
distribution of aggregate shocks. Therefore, ’ fails to impact relative welfare
in this case.
Figure 4 reports sensitivity analysis for the central bank￿ s preference pa-
rameter ￿ over the range [0.5-5].21 Under common aggregate disturbances, a
hike in ￿ is seen in panel (a) to improve relative welfare for reference countries
in the currency union. The reason is simply that, under the current parame-
terisation, a higher weight on in￿ ation implies a relatively improved ability
of the single monetary policy to narrow the price level gap. For asymmetric
aggregate productivity shocks, the improvement in member countries￿welfare
under the currency union is determined by exactly the same factor ￿=(￿2
i +￿)
discussed above for the impact of ￿0 (this time driven by changes in ￿), coupled
with the lack of reaction under the monetary union. Finally, Figure 4 shows
that, in the face of idiosyncratic disturbances, a higher value of ￿ reduces rel-
ative welfare under the currency union. This results from a muted o⁄setting
response of the single monetary policy to the shock (due to country h￿ s small
size), coupled with the increasing weight on price stability. It is worth saying,
though, that in panel (b) Cuh appears to be somewhat unresponsive to changes
in central bank preferences, in particular around benchmark parameter values.
In sum, we ￿nd that, in the face of aggregate supply shocks, a ￿ atter
20More speci￿cally, in this case the model implies that the price level gap equals ph =
~








: This result is easiest to derive from the model
presentation in the Appendix.
21Parameter ￿ is of central importance in models of monetary policy. For instance, Rogo⁄
(1985) favours the appointment of a central banker with ￿ higher than its social value in
order to achieve lower equilibrium in￿ ation rates. It is worth saying that this result does not
carry over to our model since we do not allow for in￿ ation bias.
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provement of the currency union￿ s stabilisation properties from the member
state￿ s point of view. In turn, a larger size also appears to have a favourable
impact on the reference country￿ s welfare under the currency union case, pos-
sibly with the exception of the scenario of a reference country that exhibits a
steep output-in￿ ation tradeo⁄and is mostly hit by idiosyncratic shocks. Small
catching up countries thus should, on the one hand, be adversely a⁄ected by
monetary union participation due to their initial size, while on the other bene-
￿t as they achieve real convergence via fast productivity growth. Our analysis
sheds light on the role of two other determinants of the costs of renouncing
monetary autonomy. Increased cross-country homogeneity in the slopes of the
aggregate supply curve tends to favour currency union￿ s member states with
relatively steep tradeo⁄s between output and in￿ ation. Finally, the stabilisa-
tion performance of member states is - barring idiosyncratic aggregate shocks
- enhanced by monetary unions with a higher weight on price stability relative
to output stability.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper examines the implications of monetary union for participating
countries, focusing on the comparison of a catching up member state￿ s wel-
fare in a currency union relative to that under autonomous monetary policy.
This comparison is carried out by means of sensitivity analysis with respect to
benchmark parameter values. Our approach is motivated by the notion that it
is important to better understand the determinants of stabilisation costs im-
plied by renouncing monetary autonomy, while at the same time recognising
that a number of other factors play a key role in shaping a country￿ s decision
to enter a currency union. The latter factors prominently include the trade-
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Given that members of a common currency area can be at di⁄erent stages
in the development process, it is worth allowing countries￿supply conditions
to di⁄er inside the union, especially with regard to sectoral characteristics.
For this reason, we focus on the study of scenarios in which the supply slope
parameter is not uniform across the union, while sectoral productivity shocks
are of the idiosyncratic or asymmetric type. The literature on productivity-
driven Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ects has emphasised the important role played
by sectoral shocks of the idiosyncratic or asymmetric type in driving catching
up economies. The present study ￿nds that sectoral productivity shocks on
balance hamper the stabilisation performance of small member states joining
a currency union.
We also assess the determinants of stabilisation costs of renouncing mon-
etary autonomy in the face of aggregate supply disturbances. Our analysis
shows that the output-in￿ ation tradeo⁄ and country size have welfare impli-
cations for a reference country. A ￿ atter tradeo⁄ between output and in￿ a-
tion is found to unambiguously contribute to an improvement of the currency
union￿ s stabilisation properties from the member state￿ s point of view. In turn,
a larger size also appears to have a rather favourable impact on the reference
country￿ s welfare under the currency union case, possibly excepting the case of
a reference country mostly facing idiosyncratic disturbances while exhibiting
a steep output-in￿ ation tradeo⁄.
In performing sensitivity analysis, we change one parameter at a time. One
could argue that the aggregate supply slope is related to country size because
of both aspects￿common link to trade openness. Indeed, some studies indicate
that more open economies also display a ￿ atter output-in￿ ation tradeo⁄, while
size is often seen as varying inversely with openness. In this regard, one could
22The related empirical literature includes Rose (2001), Engel and Rose (2002), Glick and
Rose (2002), Flam and Nordstrom (2003) and Micco et al. (2004). For a meta-analysis of
a currency union￿ s e⁄ect on international trade, see Rose and Stanley (2005). Frankel and
Rose (2002) and Bagella et al. (2004) investigate the impact of currency areas on output.
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enhancing e⁄ects of monetary union of the type found by Rose (2000) andbe led to conclude that, for a more open member state, the bene￿cial impact
of a ￿ atter supply curve on the currency union￿ s stabilisation properties is to a
variable extent o⁄set by a concomitant smaller size. However, we have shown
that, in the case of a catching up country exhibiting high productivity growth
in the tradable sector (and thereby subjected to exchange-rate appreciation
pressures), the relationship between the slope of the output-in￿ ation tradeo⁄
and openness could well be positive rather than ￿as often expected ￿nega-
tive. For this reason, the combination of a ￿ atter supply curve and a small
size could prove detrimental to an open catching up country￿ s participation in
the monetary union. Reinforcing this view, fast tradable productivity growth
could also be associated with the occurrence of either idiosyncratic or asym-
metric sectoral productivity shocks. A number of countervailing factors exist
notwithstanding, including the circumstances that catching up countries will
increase their size over time and that the link between openness and size is not
a linear one. With regard to the latter, it is sometimes acknowledged that size
is in￿ uenced by many other determinants that have not only economic but
also historical and socio-cultural roots (see, e.g., Alesina and and Spolaore,
2003).
Finally, our analysis sheds light on the role of two other determinants of
the costs of renouncing autonomous monetary stabilisation. A narrower cross-
country spread in the slopes of the aggregate supply curve tends to favour
currency union￿ s member states with relatively steep tradeo⁄s between output
and in￿ ation. Moreover, currency unions that display a higher preference
for price stability are found to also improve the stabilisation performance of
member states, except in the event of idiosyncratic aggregate disturbances.
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under the currency union
This Appendix describes the solution for domestic output and prices in
both countries under the currency union setup. As mentioned in the main
text, the two countries￿variables yu
i and pu
i (with i = h;f) can be determined
by solving the following four equations: two national supply curves (12) for
i = h;f; and the pair of expressions (20) and (21). These four equations can
be more explicitly written in terms of the four unknowns as follows:
yh ￿
_
yh = ￿h(ph ￿
~
ph) + "h (A.1)
yf ￿
_
yf = ￿f(pf ￿
~



































["u ￿ ’(1 ￿ ’)(￿h ￿ ￿f)￿e]
(A.4)
where we have made the plausible assumption that E(pi) =
~
pi for i = h;f:
Equations (A.1) through (A.4) deliver unique solutions for yu
i and pu
i under
country-speci￿c ￿i. Given our focus on the perspective of a catching up coun-
try, a scenario of uniform supply slopes ￿i appears not to be very relevant.
It is straightforward to see that the use of expressions (A.1) through (A.4)
may not pin down yu
i and pu
i when ￿h = ￿f = ￿. The use of logic however
suggests some reasonable solutions under uniform supply slopes. In the case of
common aggregate supply shocks, there is no di⁄erence between autonomous
monetary policy and the currency union. Asymmetric aggregate productivity
shocks do not motivate any reaction on the part of the currency union, com-
pared with the case of monetary autonomy under which the central bank can
instead partly o⁄set the shock. The most di¢ cult case is that of idiosyncratic
aggregate supply shocks. Simple ideas of fairness (such as equitable distribu-
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welfare loss functions) do not produce any (positive) solution for yu
i and pu
i . If
the single monetary authority chooses the same deviations of national prices
with respect to target, then output would deviate from its goal in ways that
are country-speci￿c. One possible solution is that of arguing that the mone-
tary autonomy equilibrium still holds in light of its Pareto optimality. In any
case, the scenario of common slopes is not so relevant for the present paper,
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